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ABSTRACT 
Theories of substance use have historically focused on the role of negative affect and 
self-control, yet few studies have examined distinct aspects of self-control as moderators of link 
between negative affect and substance use in the participant’s natural environment. The primary 
goal of this study was to examine whether different aspects of self-control (monitoring, 
adjusting, and persisting) measured using multiple methods (self-report, psychophysiological, 
behavior) moderate the relation between momentary negative affect and illicit substance use in a 
sample of current substance users with a history of substance use disorders.  I predicted that the 
adjusting and persisting, but not the monitoring aspects of self-control would moderate the 
relation between momentary negative affect and substance use, such that negative affect would 
be positively related to substance use at low levels of monitoring and adjusting. Of the 
hypotheses, the best support was for the moderating role of the adjusting aspects of self-control 
in the negative affect - substance use relation.  Specifically, negative affect was positively related 
to substance use at low levels of adjusting, but negatively related substance use at high levels of 
adjusting.  My other hypotheses received limited support. This project makes several clear 
additions to the substance use literature that will inform future research.  Most important is the 
finding that the adjusting aspects of self-control seem particularly important for understanding 
for whom negative affect may promote substance use. Persons who adjust well, in the face of 
errors, may be resilient to mood-dependent substance use. The null results for the other aspects 
of self-control (i.e., monitoring and persistence) may suggest that these aspects are less important 
than adjusting among current substance users. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite decades of research, intervention, and prevention efforts, substance use and 
substance use disorders are still a public health issue.  In the United States, approximately 24% 
of people smoke cigarettes regularly, 14% have engaged in binge drinking in the last 30 days, 
and 14% have used illicit substances in the last year (Frone, 2006; Miller et al., 2004; Rodu & 
Cole, 2009).  Moreover, in any given year, 9% of the population experiences significant 
impairment and distress from their substance use, qualifying for a diagnosis of a substance use 
disorder (Grant et al., 2004).  In addition to causing psychological distress and impairment in 
many users, substance use is also related to physical health problems including cardiovascular 
disease (Quershi et al., 2001; Roerecke & Rehm, 2010), stroke (Quershi et al., 2001; Shinton & 
Beevers 1989), cancer (Bagnardi, Blangiardo, Vecchia, & Corrao, 2001; Khuder, 2001), and 
early mortality (Castelnuovo et al., 2006; Degenhardt et al. 2010; Singleton, Degenhardt, Hall, & 
Zabransky, 2009).  Substance use also is costly to society.  It is estimated that cost of lost 
productivity, health care, treatment, and drug enforcement related to substance use is 559 billion 
dollars in the United States ($181 billion involving illegal substances; National Institute of Drug 
Abuse, 2008).  Given the high prevalence and costs of substance use, research that helps 
elucidate factors that lead to a reduction in substance use is necessary in order to inform 
prevention and treatment efforts and ultimately reduce its impact.  
 Of the  numerous candidate risk and maintenance factors for maladaptive substance use, 
the current study focuses on two psychological factors, state negative affect and trait self-control, 
for two reasons.  First, these two factors have a prominent place in most psychological theories 
of substance use (Baker et al., 2004; Conger, 1956; Hull 1981; Koob, 2009; Sayette, 1993; Steele 
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& Josephs, 1990).  Second, negative affect and self-control are targets of treatment in some 
empirically supported interventions for substance use (e.g., Bornovalova et al., 2012; Linehan et 
al., 2002; McCrady, 2008).  Despite their ubiquitous presence in theoretical models, research has 
generally found that relations between negative affect, self-control, and substance use are 
complex (e.g., Kassel, Stroud, & Paronis, 2003; Wills, Walker, Mendoza, & Ainette, 2006), 
calling for more comprehensive models.  Moreover, there are many methodological issues that 
make it difficult to adequately test the link between negative affect, self-control, and substance 
use.  This study relies on self-report, psychophysiological, behavioral, and experience sampling 
methodologies to identify how different aspects of trait self-control moderate the relation 
between state negative affect substance use in illicit substance users.   
Negative Affect and Substance Use 
 The earliest theories relating negative affect to substance use suggested that the negative 
affect associated with withdrawal was a motivation for continued substance use because 
substance use allows individuals to avoid unpleasant withdrawal symptoms (Lindesmith, 1947; 
Wikler, 1948).  Building on this idea, Conger (1956) suggested that alcohol might be reinforcing 
because of its ability to reduce anxiety and fear even in the absence of withdrawal, motivating 
people to drink during states of general negative affect.  Since these early theories, multiple lines 
of research support the proposed link between negative affect and substance use.  First, 
individuals who use substances often report using them as a way to reduce negative affect 
(Patrick et al., 2011; Piasecki et al., 2010), although research suggests that the ability of 
substance use to reduce negative affect is complex (e.g., it may regulate some emotions better 
than others or only following certain situations; Moberg & Curtin, 2009; Perkins et al., 2010).  
Second, personality traits related to the tendency to experience negative affect (e.g., neuroticism) 
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are associated with substance use and substance use disorders (Kotov et al., 2010; Settles et al., 
2012). Third, state negative affect predicts future substance use for alcohol, nicotine, and 
marijuana (Armeli et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2012; Conklin & Perkins, 2005; Kidorf & Lang, 
1999; Shapiro et al., 2002; Swedsen et al., 2000; though see Shifman et al., 2002 for null results 
for nicotine). Fourth, research has shown that as substance dependence develops, the stress 
response becomes more similar to withdrawal symptoms, which are a cue for substance use (Fox 
et al., 2005; Sinha et al., 2000).  In other words, it becomes difficult to distinguish between 
distress due to withdrawal and distress in general, which may increase the likelihood of 
substance use during all periods of negative affect.  Finally, negative affect resulting from stress 
is often a trigger for relapse among those trying to remain abstinent (e.g., McKay et al., 2006; 
Shiffman et al., 1996; 2004).   
It should also be noted that there are theories and empirical results that support a similar 
relation for positive affect and substance use (e.g., Baker et al., 2004).  This research has focused 
on self-reported motives for use, contrasting enhancement motives (e.g., drinking to increase 
positive affect) and coping motives (drinking to reduce negative affect; Bonn-Miller, Zvolensky, 
& Bernstein, 2007; Patrick, Yeomans-Maldonado & Griffin, 2016; Ward, Kersh, & Shanks, 
1997).  Findings from this work indicate that coping motives are more predictive of substance 
use disorders than enhancement motives (Benschop et al., 2015; Carpenter & Hasin, 1999; van 
der pol, et al., 2013). The implication of these results is that the relation between positive affect 
and substance use may be more normative, whereas the relation between negative affect and 
substance use may reflect more problematic use. This is consistent with the broader literature 
showing that negative affect explains the most variance in mental disorders (e.g., Tackett et al., 
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2013; though see Stanton et al., 2016 for evidence of positive affect’s role).  Hence, I focus on 
negative affect, given evidence of its explanatory power for disordered substance use. 
 Though the link between negative affect and substance use has a body of support, there 
are a number of unresolved issues in the literature. One major issue is that most empirical studies 
in humans have largely focused on alcohol (e.g., Armeli et al., 2007; Swedsen et al., 2000) and 
tobacco (e.g., Conklin & Perkins, 2005; Shifman et al., 1996).  Although a few recent studies 
have begun to establish this link for marijuana (e.g., Buckner et al., 2012; Buckner et al., 2013; 
Schrier et al., 2012), research lags behind in terms of other forms of illicit substances (e.g., 
cocaine, opioids), which are associated with greater negative consequences than marijuana. 
Studies have also often looked at the use of one substance in isolation, even though many people 
report regular use of several substances over time (e.g., Chan, Kelly, Carroll, & Williams, 2017; 
Kecojevic, Jun, Reisner, & Corliss, 2017).  Moreover, previous research has found a more 
consistent link between negative affect and alcohol use than negative affect and tobacco use 
(e.g., Shiffman, 2009; Shiffman et al., 2002; Swedsen et al., 2000).  Therefore, it is necessary to 
test whether such a relation holds for illicit drugs, rather than assuming that the results generalize 
to other substances.   
The extant research is also inadequate because of limitations inherent in common 
methodologies used.  Some research linking negative affect and substance use relies on 
retrospective reporting of affect and/or substance use (e.g., Bonn-Miller, Zvolensky, & Johnson, 
2010; Bujarski & Ray, 2014; Patrick et al., 2011; Piasecki et al., 2010).  Questionnaires used in 
these studies ask participants to report affect and substance use over a long time period (e.g., the 
number of times you used cocaine in the last month).  Because of the cognitive demands of these 
items, participants generally rely on heuristics and their own lay-theories rather than 
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mathematically aggregating behavior and/or affect over the time period, introducing bias into 
their responding (Gorin & Stone, 2001; Mayer, McCormick & Strong; Piasecki, Hufford, 
Solhan, & Trull, 2007; Robinson & Clore, 2002).  Laboratory studies overcome this limitation; 
however, they involve highly artificial environments, calling into question the generalizability of 
findings from the laboratory.  For instance, in contrast to experimental substance use studies, 
most substance use occurs in the presence of others and in the late hours of the night (e.g., 
Buckner, Crosby, Silgado, Wonderlich, & Schmidt, 2012; Hopper et al., 2006; Fairbairn & 
Sayette, 2014).  
One method that circumvents both of these issues is ecological momentary assessment, 
which involves participants making multiple ratings in near real-time (e.g., “How do you feel 
right now?”) in their natural environment with an electronic device (e.g., a cell phone; Shiffman, 
Stone, & Hufford, 2008).  Despite the potential challenges of this methodology in substance 
using samples (e.g., concerns about compliance, reactance, or responding while intoxicated), 
ecological momentary assessment has been used in various aspects of substance use research for 
over two decades (e.g., Litt, Cooney, & Morse, 1998; Shiffman et al., 2002; Swendsen et al., 
2000; for a review see Shiffman, 2008).  Still, there is a dearth of studies using this methodology 
with participants engaged in illicit substance use other than marijuana (for examples of 
feasibility studies, see Epstein et al., 2009; Hopper et al., 2006).  Finally, despite the theoretical 
work supporting a strong connection between negative affect and substance use, a review of 
ecological momentary assessment studies suggests that evidence for the links between negative 
affect and substance use are nuanced and mixed, with many studies finding a relation between 
negative affect and subsequent substance use (e.g., Buckner et al., 2012; Swendsen et al., 2000; 
Weinberger & McKee, 2012) and other studies reporting no relation (e.g., Bacon, & Thomas, 
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2013; Merrill, Wardell, & Read, 2009; Shiffman et al., 2002). This may suggest that there are 
important individual-level moderators that can explain for whom the experience of negative 
affect leads to substance use.  Individual differences in self-control could be one factor that may 
moderate the relation between negative affect and illicit substance use. 
Self-control as a Moderator of the Negative Affect – Substance Use Relationship 
 Self-control is often defined in one of two ways.  Sometimes it is described as the ability 
to adjust one’s own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors to pursue a goal (Baumeister & Vohs, 
2003).  Other times, self-control is defined as the ability to resist temptation and persist toward a 
goal (Hofmann et al., 2011).1  Theories also posit that in order for self-control to occur, an 
individual must identify the need for self-control via monitoring progress toward goals (Carver 
& Scheier, 1998; Robinson et al., 2010).  Noticing a discrepancy between the current state and 
the desired state signals the need for self-control.  Thus, in the present project, self-control is 
defined as involving at least three components: a monitoring process and two operating 
processes, adjustment and persistence.  Although self-control can be thought of as a state (i.e., 
“Did I adjust my behavior in a specific situation?”; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Tice, 
Baumeister, Shmueli & Muraven, 2007; Wan & Sternthal, 2008), individuals differ in their 
tendency to enact self-control across situations (i.e., “Do I tend to adjust my behavior when 
necessary?”; Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2010; Robinson, 2007; Tangey, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; 
Weinberg, Riesel, & Hajcak, 2010).  The current study focuses on the latter (dispositional self-
                                                 
1 Self-control is conceptually similar to constructs such as executive function (Miyake & Friedman, 2012), cognitive 
control (Robinson, Schmeichel, & Inzlicht, 2010), emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), and distress tolerance (Leyro, 
Zvolensk, Berstein, 2010).  Although not the focus of the current studies, my view is that executive function and 
cognitive control are cognitive processes that allow for self-control to happen (i.e., executive functions are the 
cognitive building blocks of self-control).  Emotion regulation is a higher order function that relies on both 
executive function and self-control (e.g., adjustment of behavior).  Finally, distress tolerance is persisting during 
physical or psychological distress, meaning that it is a special case of persistence (Leyro et al., 2010). 
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control) because it represents a relatively stable vulnerability factor likely to play a role in the 
development and maintenance of maladaptive substance use across situations. 
For self-control to happen in any given instance, it is necessary for the individual to 
notice the discrepancy between the goal state and current state (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Robinson et al., 2010). For example, an individual who wants to obtain a job, but is perhaps not 
currently engaged in any behaviors leading to that goal (e.g., sitting at home all day), may 
experience negative affect (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins 1986). This negative affect 
increases the urge to use substances for a variety of reasons (e.g., they may have the expectation 
that substance use reduces negative affect; Smith, 1989). In order to reduce the negative affect 
and work toward the goal, the individual needs to notice the need for self-control.  Once the need 
is detected, self-control can be implemented in two ways, which map onto the definitions above. 
One option is that the individual may decide to adjust their thoughts, feelings, or behaviors to be 
more in line with their current goals.  That is, instead of staying at home, the individual can 
decide to complete and return job applications. The other option is for the individual to ignore 
temptation and persist toward the current goal. In this case, the individual may experience the 
urge to use substances, but resist this temptation knowing that it could affect the pursuit of the 
goal (e.g., they may not pass a drug test).   
According to this model, self-control failure (in this case, using substances) in any given 
situation could occur for a number of reasons.  If the individual does not notice the need for self-
control, they will be unable to use it, suggesting that monitoring is necessary for self-control 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998).  However, simply noting the need for self-control is insufficient.  The 
individual must also engage in either adjustment or persistence successfully, in order to avoid 
engaging in behavior inconsistent with their goal.  Moreover, successfully implementing self-
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control in any one situation may not be as important as an individual’s tendency to successfully 
implement self-control across situations, suggesting that individual differences in self-control 
may be more important than state self-control for understanding maladaptive substance use. 
Because monitoring is necessary but not sufficient for self-control, individual differences 
in the tendency to monitor are likely to have very little effect on the negative affect-substance 
use link. In contrast, individual differences in adjusting and persisting are likely to moderate this 
link. Specifically, for individuals who tend to adjust their behavior or persist in the face of 
temptation (versus those who do not), the link between state negative affect and substance use 
will be weaker. Such a model may have predictive power among substance users trying to 
remain abstinent as well as among those who are continuing to use substances. The abstinent 
person would need to implement self-control to avoid using substances as part of their abstinence 
goals, and the current users would need to implement self-control to avoid using substances in 
situations in which it would be highly counterproductive to the person’s life goals (e.g., at work, 
to avoid incarceration).  Thus, self-control is expected to moderate the negative affect-substance 
use relation among current users, and not only among those with abstinence goals. 
Multi-method Assessment of the Different Aspects of Self-control 
Individual differences in self-control can be assessed in a number of ways.  There are a 
multitude of self-report scales that assess different aspects of self-control (e.g., Roth et al., 2005; 
Simons & Gaher, 2005; Tangney et al., 2004; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).  For example, the 
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; Roth et al., 2005) indexes a number 
of aspects of executive function and self-control.  Based on a content analysis of the items, three 
of the nine subscales were deemed particularly relevant to the current investigation (task 
monitoring, shifting, and inhibition), as they map on to the above-named aspects of self-control, 
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namely monitoring, adjusting, and persisting. The task monitoring subscale measures frequency 
of making careless mistakes, (e.g., “I make careless errors when completing task”), which is in 
line with difficulties in detecting the need for self-control (i.e., you make careless mistakes 
because you do not detect the discrepancy between goal and outcome.). The shifting subscale 
measures problems in switching from one task to another and deficits in problem-solving 
flexibility (e.g., “I have trouble changing from one activity or task to another”), which would 
could be in line with problems in adjusting behavior when it is not in line with goals (e.g., “not 
shifting back to the main task following mistakes). The items on the inhibition subscale (e.g., “I 
have trouble sitting still”) have some parallels to persistence, because persistence requires 
inhibiting the impulse to pursue other goals or give up pursuit of the current goal. Prior research 
shows that scores on the BRIEF are lower for individuals who have self-control issues (e.g., 
children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder; Yers et al., 2009) and are related to 
outcomes indicative of lower abilities in self-control (e.g., academic performance; Rabin et al., 
2011), which have also been related to psychophysiological and behavioral measurements of 
self-control. 
One limitation of these scales is that they assess perceived self-control rather than actual 
self-control.  That is, people may report that they are high (or low) in self-control, based on 
highly biased evidence from their lives (e.g., cognitive distortions), when in fact they are not.  
This is one interpretation of the small-to-nil correlations between self-report and behavioral 
measures of self-control (e.g., Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovish, 2013). 
Another interpretation is that measures like the BRIEF index problems in self-control as they 
manifest in everyday life (e.g., academic procrastination; Rabin et al., 2011), whereas the special 
conditions that are set up for psychophysiological and behavioral tasks in the laboratory may 
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capture different abilities in self-control that may or may not overlap with everyday ability.  With 
either interpretation, it is useful to triangulate self-report measures with psychophysiological and 
behavioral indices for more well-rounded measurements of self-control ability. Finding similar 
results across different modalities (e.g., self-report and behavior) provides stronger evidence that 
the result may be due to a core aspect of self-control (i.e., the shared variance) than results that 
only exist for one modality (e.g. self-report). 
In terms of psychophysiology, the most well-known index of the monitoring aspect of 
self-control is the error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring et al., 1993).  The ERN, an event-
related potential that is a negative deflection maximal at midline sites, peaks between 50 and 200 
milliseconds (ms) following an error of commission.  The ERN is proposed to be a neural signal 
that detects the discrepancy between the actual and correct response, with larger (i.e., more 
negative) ERNs being related to increased detection of an error (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung, 
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004).  Thus, a larger (more negative) ERN is an index of increased 
monitoring ability and is related to self-control outcomes (e.g., academic performance; Hirsh & 
Inzlicht, 2010; substance use relapse; Marhe, van de Wetering, & Franken, 2013).  Research has 
found a high test-retest reliability for the ERN, suggesting that it is a stable, trait-like measure 
(Myer, Bress, & Proudfit, 2014; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011).  In terms of ERN relationships with 
self-report measures of monitoring, only one prior study examined this and found no significant 
correlation between ERN and task monitoring on the BRIEF (Chang, Davies, & Gavin, 2009); 
however, this study had a small sample to detect the small correlations that might be expected. 
An ERP component related to the ERN is the feedback related negativity (FRN).  The 
FRN is a peak that is more negative in response to feedback than an error was made (e.g., loss) 
compared to positive feedback (e.g., wins). The FRN seems to reflect reactivity to reward versus 
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punishment. Increased FRN has been related to self-report measures of reward sensitivity (Bres 
& Hajcak, 2013) and reduced FRN has been found in depression, which can be characterized by 
an insensitivity to reward (Kujawa, Proudfit, & Klein, 2014).  The theoretical link between ERN 
and FRN comes from probabilistic learning tasks (Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005), 
which show that the FRN is elicited while the participants are learning the response mappings 
(i.e., the brain response is to the feedback), but once the participants learn which responses are 
correct and incorrect, the ERN is elicited (i.e., the brain response is to the button press prior to 
the feedback).  Thus, both the FRN and ERN are indexes of error detection but they are occur at 
different stages in the learning process.  To my knowledge, no study has examined whether FRN 
is correlated to self-reported problems in task monitoring. 
In terms of measures of adjustment relevant to error monitoring, behavioral measures are 
most used in the literature (Robinson et al., 2010). Behavioral adjustment has been 
operationalized as the tendency for individuals to slow down on the trial following an error of 
commission on cognitive tasks (Rabbit, 1966; Robinson, 2007).  This post-error slowing (PES) is 
thought to reflect an increase in response caution (Botvinick et al., 2001; Dutilh et al., 2012).  
Thus, following an error, adjusting one’s responding speed prevents a subsequent error.  
Individual differences in the tendency to slow down following an error have been related to 
academic performance (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2010) and emotion regulation (Robinson, 2007).  No 
prior study has reported the correlation between PES and problems in shifting on the BRIEF. 
The last aspect of self-control, persistence, has been measured by a variety of behavioral 
tasks, some of which require participants to tolerate either physical or emotional distress (for a 
review see Leyro et al., 2010).  One commonly used task that captures the ability to persist 
during psychological distress is the mirror-tracing task, which requires participants to persist at a 
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difficult and frustrating task for as long as they can (i.e., tracing objects as if looking in a mirror).  
Previous research has shown that compared to healthy controls, individuals with substance use 
disorders have poorer performance on this task (McHugh & Otto, 2012; Quinn, Brandon, & 
Copeland, 1996). Additionally, poorer performance on this task is related to relapse among 
smokers and treatment drop-out among substance users (Brown et al., 2002; Daughters et al., 
2005). Another measure of persistence, specific to persistence in the face of physical discomfort, 
involves measuring participant’s ability to hold their breath.  Similar to the mirror-tracing 
paradigm, shorter breath holding times are related to relapse, particularly among smokers 
(Brown et al., 2009; Hajek et al., 1987).  No prior studies have examined the correlation between 
these measures and the inhibition subscale of the BRIEF. 
Previous research has found group differences on the three aspects of self-control when 
comparing individuals with and without a substance use disorder.  For example, compared to 
controls, individuals with cocaine dependence (Franken et al., 2007; Sokhadze et al., 2008), 
nicotine dependence. (Luijten et al., 2011), marijuana dependence (Forman et al., 2004), and 
opiate dependence (Hester et al., 2013) have smaller ERNs, indicating reduced monitoring of the 
need for self-control (for null results see Franken, van Strien, & Kuijpers, 2010).  Similar results 
exist for adjustment, specifically PES (Hester et al., 2013; Lawrence et al., 2009; Luijten et al., 
2011), and persistence (Brown et al., 2002; Daughters et al., 2005; Hajek et al., 1987; McHugh 
& Otto, 2012).   
There are three main limitations to the aforementioned research in this area.  First, the 
cross-sectional nature of these studies does not inform us on the ability of self-control to predict 
future substance use, and the few longitudinal studies looking at ERN and substance use that do 
exist focus on relapse following treatment (e.g., Luijten, Kleinjan, & Franken, 2016; Marhe et 
 13 
al., 2013; Matheus-Roth, Schenk, Wiltfang, Scherbaum, & Muller, 2016), which may not 
generalize to use among current users who may not be interested in abstaining. Second, because 
this work compares users and non-users, it does not allow inferences about how self-control 
might be related to the maintenance of substance use, once started.  Finally, few of these studies 
incorporate the interaction between trait self-control and state negative affect, and to my 
knowledge no study has looked at multimodal assessments of self-control in conjunction with 
state negative affect and illicit substance use in the participant’s natural environment. 
Current Study 
 The primary goal of this study was to examine whether different aspects of self-control 
(monitoring, adjusting, and persisting) measured using multiple instruments (self-report, 
psychophysiological, behavior) moderate the relation between negative affect and illicit 
substance use in a sample of current substance users with a history of substance use disorders.  
For purposes of identifying the specificity of the negative affect-substance use relationship, 
secondary analyses explored whether self-control moderated substance use links to positive 
affect.  In order to address a number of limitations of the current literature, this study used a 
combination of laboratory tasks and ecological momentary assessment. In sum, the multi-method 
approach allowed for well-rounded measurement of self-control ability, while simultaneously 
reducing retrospective reporting of affect and substance use, and thus, increasing ecological 
validity.  
 The proposed study had three hypotheses.  First, momentary negative affect at one time 
point, as assessed during with ecological momentary assessment, was expected to prospectively 
predict substance use at the subsequent time point, consistent with research on non-illicit 
substances (e.g., Armeli et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 2012).  Second, because monitoring is 
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necessary but not sufficient for self-control (e.g., Robinson et al., 2010), it was predicted that 
individual differences in monitoring would not moderate the relation between momentary 
negative affect and substance use2.  Third, consistent with the proposed model, it was predicted 
that individual differences in adjustment and persistence would moderate the negative affect - 
substance use relation, such that at low levels of adjustment and persistence, there would be a 
positive relation between negative affect and substance use.  This relation, however, will not be 
present at high levels of adjustment and persistence.   
I considered the analyses in regard to positive affect exploratory for two reasons.  First, 
although there is theory suggesting that positive affect plays a role in continued substance use 
(e.g., Cooper, 1994; Patrick et al., 2016), there has been limited prior research and theory to 
guide predictions of how self-control might moderate this relation. Second an argument could be 
made for two mutually exclusive moderating relations.  One the one hand, the relation between 
positive affect and substance use may be stronger at higher self-control among current users 
because one motive of use is to enhance positive affect.  On the other hand, the relation between 
positive affect and substance use may be stronger at lower self-control because one study found 
that people who are high in positive urgency (i.e., the tendency to be impulsive during periods of 
positive affect) are more likely to engage drinking behavior during periods of positive affect 
(Cyders et al., 2010). Given the lack of clear hypotheses, these analyses were considered 
exploratory.  
                                                 
2 Although in null hypothesis significance testing, it is generally not advised to predict the null, in interval 
estimation it is possible to show that the point estimate is essentially zero and the confidence interval is so narrow 
around zero that the inference of no effect is warranted (e.g., Cummings, 2014) 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants for this study were recruited from two sources.  Sixteen participants were 
recruited from a pool of participants who completed a previous study in our lab (for published 
results, see Edwards & Verona, 2016; Mager, Bresin, & Verona, 2014; Verona, Murphy & 
Javdani, 2016). An additional 45 participants were recruited from advertisements in the 
community, including Craigslist, Reddit, and word of mouth. There were slightly different 
inclusion criteria used for the two sources, based on the amount of information available prior to 
participants coming into the lab. 
Participants from the previous study were selected from a sample of 318 participants 
recruited from the community and substance use treatment centers.  The eligibility criteria for the 
parent study were: substance use, aggression, and/or criminal charges related to either substance 
use or aggression in the last six months. In the parent study, the substance use module of the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 
2002) was administered to obtain diagnostic and symptom information for alcohol use and 
substance use disorders.  From this sample, those who indicated that their most problematic drug 
was something other than marijuana or alcohol and met diagnostic criteria for a substance use 
disorder for this most problematic drug, were contacted via email or phone and asked about 
recent substance use and ownership of a smart phone (N = 167).  I was able to reach 30 of these 
potential participants because we no longer had working phone numbers for many of them. 
Those who reported no use of any substances (including alcohol or marijuana) in the last month 
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or no access to a smartphone were not invited to participate in the current study (N = 10).  Of 
those remaining, 20 agreed to participate and 16 showed up to the session.  
Participants recruited anew for the study contacted the lab based on paper or electronic 
advertisements and were screened via email or phone for recent (i.e. last month) alcohol and 
substance use and ownership of a smartphone. Potential participants who reported any use of 
illicit substances, other than or in addition to marijuana (alcohol use was neither inclusionary or 
exclusionary), in the last month and who owned a smartphone were invited to participate.  For 
these participants, the SCID module for the assessment of substance and alcohol use disorders 
was completed at the start of the laboratory session.  Thus, unlike those recruited from the 
previous study, the inclusionary criteria involved only current illicit substance use, but not 
necessarily a substance use disorder (although the latter was assessed at the laboratory session).  
In sum, a total of 61 participants (n = 29, 47% women) participated in the study. Table 1 
shows the demographic information for the entire sample and by recruitment source. The two 
recruitment subsamples differed on ethnicity, education, and income, with those recruited from 
the previous study more likely to be older, of lower income and education levels and self-identify 
as Black/African American. They did not differ on gender (p = .416) or ethnicity (p =.289). 
Given group differences, relevant demographic variables and recruitment source were explored 
as covariates. 
Substance use history. Even though participants were recruited for historical and recent 
use of illicit substances other than marijuana, 43% (n = 26) reported marijuana as their most 
problematic drug of use (exclusively those from the newly recruited subsample). Cocaine (n = 
14, 23%) and opioids (n = 11, 18%) were the next most commonly reported problematic drugs. 
Other substances that were less common were stimulants (n = 2, 3%), sedatives (n = 1, 2%), and 
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polysubstance use (n = 4, 7%). Recruitment source did not significantly differentiate those 
endorsing cocaine (old: 64% of cocaine users; new: 36%, p = .423) or opioids (old: 36%; new: 
63%, p = .548) as the most problematic drug.  The small numbers for stimulants, sedatives, and 
polysubstance use made it difficult to determine whether differences in these endorsements 
differed across recruitment source. 
Based on the SCID and DSM-IV criteria, participants had an average of 3.27 (SD = 3.15) 
lifetime symptoms of alcohol use disorders and 5.34 (SD = 3.95) lifetime symptoms of substance 
use disorders. About 53% (n = 34) met lifetime criteria for an alcohol use disorder and 73% (n = 
44) met lifetime criteria for a substance use disorder.  Individuals recruited from the previous 
study had significantly more lifetime symptoms for both alcohol and substance use disorders (see 
Table 1) and were more likely to have a lifetime diagnosis of alcohol (OR = 8.40, 95% CI [1.70, 
41.43]) or substance (OR = 7.75, 95% CI [.93, 64.51]) use disorder. Substance use disorder 
symptom counts (i.e., number of symptoms) were also explored as covariates.  
Procedure 
 The study consisted of two aspects, a laboratory session, where individual differences in 
self-control were assessed, and a 14-day ecological momentary assessment protocol, where state 
negative affect, positive affect, and substance use were measured. 
Laboratory session. After providing consent, participants who had not completed the 
previous study were interviewed for alcohol and substance use disorders with the substance use 
module of SCID by the author (an advanced PhD student).  Additionally, all participants 
provided information about the number of alcohol and substance use days in last week via a 
timeline follow-back (TLFB) interview (Sobell & Sobell, 1992).  Next, the EEG cap and 
electrodes were applied.  During this time, participants completed demographic questionnaires.  
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Once the EEG cap was attached, participants completed a variant of the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974; Hall et al., 2007), which yielded the ERN and PES, and completed the doors task, 
which yielded the FRN.  Following these tasks, the EEG electrodes were removed. Then, the 
participants completed the mirror-tracing (Strong et al., 2006) and breath-holding tasks 
(Zvolensky et al., 2001), which assessed the persistence-based aspects of self-control 
(psychological and physical persistence, respectively).  Finally, participants were given 
instructions for the ecological momentary assessment protocol at the end of this session. 
 Ecological momentary assessment. The ecological momentary assessment protocol 
consisted of 4 ratings per day (prompts sent at 10am, 1pm, 4pm, and 7pm) for 14 days.  
Participants completed the assessments on their smart phone via a secure website (i.e., 
Qualtrics). Participants received emails with links to the surveys at the scheduled times and had 
until the next email to complete them (i.e., 3 hours), aside from the final prompt when 
participants were informed to complete surveys before they went to bed.  Within the same day, 
prompts were completed on average 3.71 hours apart with a standard deviation of 2.88 hours.  
All participants started the protocol the day after their laboratory visit and continued for 14 days.  
Approximately 7 days after their laboratory session, participants visited the lab to get paid for 
their first week of the momentary assessment.  This was done to increase compliance (cf., Engel 
et al., 2013; Smyth et al., 2007). During this visit, participants also completed a TLFB interview 
to assess alcohol and substance use days in the last week.  Similar procedures were completed at 
the end of the second week. 
Across the 14 days of the ecological momentary assessment, participants completed an 
average of 38 (median = 40, mode =35, min = 3, max =56) out of 56 possible surveys (two 
participants completed no surveys), leading to 67% compliance (median = 72, mode =63, min = 
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5, max =100), which is in line with previous studies with other substance using samples 
(Buckner, Crosby, Wonderlich, & Schmidt, 2012; Serre et al., 2012).  Participants completed 
slightly fewer surveys during the second week (M = 19.23, SD = 7.12) compared to the first 
week (M = 20.53, SD = 5.57), but this difference was not significant, t(111) = 1.08, p = .282, d = 
-.29.  Within a day, when participants responded to one prompt, they responded to the next 
prompt 93% of the time. This suggests that when participants missed prompts, they tended to 
miss entire days, not certain prompts within days.  Participants were marginally more likely to 
miss the next prompt when they reported substance use at the current prompt, t(1753)=1.85, p = 
.064; however, the difference was small (94% versus 92%, OR = 1.39, 95% CI [.98, 1.97]).  This 
suggests that substance use at one time point had minimal effects on compliance at the next 
prompt. 
Given that there are no agreed upon guidelines for how much compliance is enough and 
the researcher degrees of freedom involved in defining a compliance rate to be included in the 
study (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Wicherts et al., 2016), I included all 
participants and then conducted a follow up analysis that included compliance as a covariate. 
Laboratory Measures and Tasks  
Timeline follow-back. The timeline follow-back (TLFB) interview uses memory cues 
(e.g., birthdays) to help reduce recall bias when reporting recent substance use (Sobell & Sobell, 
1992).  Participants are first asked to report any major events that happened to them in the last 
week.  Then participants report drug and alcohol use day by day. A large body of research shows 
that the TLFB interview is reliable and has good validity for alcohol and illicit substance use 
(Hjorthøj, Hjorthøj, & Nordentoft, 2012; Hoeppner, South, Jackson, & Barnett, 2010; Sobell & 
Sobell, 1992).  Studies that have compared the TLFB to ecological momentary assessment 
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reports of substance use show that ecological momentary assessment data tends to be more 
accurate (i.e., less rounding errors; Shiffman, 2009). We had TLFB for three time points: the 
week before the ecological momentary assessment protocol (TLFB-Pre), the first week of the 
protocol (TLFB Week 1) and the second week of the protocol (TLFB Week 2).  In this study, the 
TLFB method was used to assess whether participating in the ecological momentary assessment 
daily would affect substance use. We compared the number of alcohol and substance use days 
reported on the TLFB from the week before the ecological momentary assessment protocol to 
that reported during the protocol.  These data were also used to provide convergent validity for 
the ecological momentary assessment data by showing similar estimates for the number of 
alcohol and substance use days during the protocol period. 
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF). To measure self-reported 
aspects of self-control, the BRIEF (Roth et al., 2005) was administered. It is a 75 item self-report 
measure of executive function.  The items load on to nine different subscales.  I focused on three 
(task monitoring, shifting, and inhibition), based on their conceptual overlap with monitoring, 
adjusting, and persistence.  Participants rated items on a three-point scale (0 = never a problem, 1 
= sometimes a problem, 3 = often a problem) as to the amount of difficulties in functioning they 
experienced in each of these domains in the last 6 months.  The task monitoring subscale 
contained 6 items (sample item: “I make careless errors when completing task.”; α = .82) and 
indicated the extent to which the individual had problems with mistakes in their work.  The 
shifting subscale contained 6 items (sample item: “I have trouble changing from one activity or 
task to another.”; α = .81) and indexed problems in adjusting from one task to another.  The 
inhibit subscale contained 8 items (sample item: “I have trouble sitting still.”; α = .79) and 
indexed problems with patience and waiting for one’s turn. 
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Flanker task. The flanker task requires participants to respond with a button press to a 
central stimulus (H or S) flanked by two letters on each side, which can be congruent (e.g., 
SSSSS) or incongruent (HHSHH; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974).  To increase task complexity (and 
thus the number of errors), a non-target (X) was displayed (with congruent or incongruent 
flankers) on 16% of trials, and participants were instructed to withhold responses to these non-
targets (Hall et al., 2007).  For each trial, the stimulus array was displayed for 150 ms and 
participants had up to 1400 ms to respond. The inter-trial interval varied among 1500, 2000, and 
2500 ms.  After a practice block, participants completed six blocks of 100 trials each.  To further 
increase task complexity, response mappings (left hand for one target letter, right hand for the 
other target letter) changed between blocks.   
Response time and accuracy of responding were recorded along with EEG. EEG was 
recorded with a 32 channel stretch lycra electrode cap (Electrocap, Eaton, OH) using the 10–20 
international system. Analog signals were digitized at 2,000 Hz with a .15–200 HZ bandpass 
filter using Neuroscan2 amplifiers (Compumedics, Charlotte, NC). This task was used to 
measure one aspect of monitoring (ERN) and adjusting (PES). 
Doors task. The doors task requires participants to choose between two doors presented 
on a screen as to which they think has a prize behind it (Kujawa et al., 2014).  On each trial, 
participants are shown the two images of doors on the right and left hand sides of the screen.  
After participants choose one door by pressing a button on the keyboard, they are shown a 
fixation for 1,000 ms and then feedback for 2,000 ms.  Participants are told that if they see a 
green arrow pointing up, they have won $0.50 on that trial, whereas if they see a red arrow 
pointing down, they have lost $0.25 on that trial.  The different values for wins and losses are 
based on prior research showing that losses loom larger then rewards; thus even though they are 
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different numerical values, they are roughly equivalent in subjective win/loss value (Hajcak, 
Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006).  There was a total of 60 (30 wins and 30 losses) trials 
displayed in 3 blocks of 20.  After the task, participants were correctly told that they had earned 
an additional $5.00 of payment.  EEG was recorded during this task and it was used to calculate 
another ERP measure of monitoring, the FRN. 
Mirror tracing. Persistence in the face of emotional distress was measured with the 
mirror-tracing task, which requires participants to use the computer mouse to trace objects on the 
computer screen (Strong et al., 2006).  However, the mouse and cursor movements are opposite 
(e.g., moving the mouse down leads the cursor to go up).  Moreover, when participants made a 
mistake, a loud buzz sound was played and participants were brought back to the beginning of 
the object.  There were three different shapes to trace.  The first two are relatively easy (e.g., a 
straight line) and have time limits. The third shape, on which participants have unlimited time, is 
a star, which is difficult to trace. For this shape, participants are told to press any button when 
they wish to terminate the task. No reward was provided for continuing longer on the task.  The 
time spent working on the difficult star shape was recorded as an index of persistence. 
Breath holding. Persistence in the face of physical distress was measured by a breath 
holding task. As in previous research (Zvolensky et al., 2001), participants were asked to breathe 
normally for 30 seconds, and then completely exhale and hold their breath for as long as they 
could.  A timer was started once participants completed their exhale and stopped when they took 
a breath in.  This process was repeated for a total of three trials, which were averaged as a 
measure of persistence.  
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Multimethod Self-control Measures 
 Monitoring. Monitoring was operationalized in three ways: self-reported problems in task 
monitoring on the BRIEF, ERN from the flanker task, and FRN from the doors task. The ERN 
was calculated using the physbox add on the EEGlab toolbox in Matlab (Curtin, 2011; Delorme 
& Makeig, 2004) from the flanker task.  First, the EEG data were re-referenced to the average of 
the two mastoids.  Then a .1-30 Hz butterworth filter was applied.  Blink artifacts were removed 
using a regression procedure proposed by Semlitsch et al., (1986). Next, the trials were epoched, 
with from 500 ms before the response until 1000 after the response and then averaged for correct 
and incorrect trials within-participant.  Consistent with other research (e.g., Meyer, Hajcak, 
Tropey-Newman, Kujawa, & Klein, 2015; Weinberg, Klein, Hajcak, 2012), we subtracted the 
average activity from -500 to -300 ms from each data point to adjust the baseline.  The ERN and 
correct-related negativity were defined as the average activity from 90 to 190 ms post response 
(cf. Weinberg et al 2012).  Participants made an average of 54.46 errors on the task (min =2, max 
= 386), which is well above the recommended number of error trials to calculate the ERN (i.e., 6; 
Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011).  Although one participant was below the recommended number of 
trials for a reliable average ERN, the statistical significance of the results did not change whether 
they were included or not; therefore, I included them in the ERN analyses because even with 
their limited data, they should help improve the precision of the estimates (Cumming, 2014). A 
difference score was created by subtracting the correct-related negativity from the ERN, which 
means that negative values indicate more monitoring. 
 The initial steps for the FRN were similar to ERN (e.g., re-reference to the average 
mastoid).  For FRN, the epochs were 500 ms before the onset of feedback to 600 ms post 
feedback on the doors task.  These epochs were then averaged within-participant for wins and 
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loss feedback separately.  In line with other research with the doors task (e.g., Kujawa et al., 
2014), the FRN was defined as the average amplitude from 275 to 375 ms following the onset of 
the feedback.  A difference score was created by subtracting the win feedback trials from the loss 
feedback trials.  As with the ERN, negative values indicate more monitoring. 
Adjusting. Adjusting was operationalized as self-reported shifting problems on the 
BRIEF and with our behavioral index of PES. PES, or slowing of reaction time following error 
trials, was extracted from the flanker task used to extract ERN.  First, trials that were excessively 
fast (<150 ms) or slow (> 1,000) were dropped (5% of trials).  Then, two averages were 
calculated for each participant, one for the reaction time on correct trials following an error and 
the other for reaction time on correct trials following a correct trial.  A difference score was 
calculated by subtracting reaction time for trials following correct trials from reaction time 
following incorrect trials (e.g., Robinson, 2007; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008); thus, positive 
values indicate more adjusting. 
 Persistence. Persistence was operationalized in three ways, self-report inhibition 
problems on the BRIEF, time until “quitting” on the mirror-tracing task, and the average of the 
three breath-holding times. 
Ecological Momentary Assessment Measures 
Momentary negative affect. Each momentary assessment began with participants 
completing the 20-item Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988).  Participants indicated how they felt “right now in the current moment” on a 5 
point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all/slightly, 5 = extremely).  The PANAS has two subscales, 
positive affect (e.g., “excited”; α = .92) and negative affect (e.g., “distressed”; α = .88), each 
indexed by 10 items.  The PANAS has been used in several ecological momentary assessment 
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studies (Engel et al., 2014; Trull et al., 2008) and has adequate psychometric properties (Burg et 
al., 2013; Watson & Clark, 1995; Watson et al., 1988). 
Substance use. At each assessment, participants reported whether there had been any use 
of alcohol and/or illicit drugs (marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, opioids, or other) since the last 
assessment. Participants were instructed to report any substance use that occurred after the last 
survey of the day (~ 7 pm) at the next morning’s assessment. Each survey was time stamped, so 
that day of the week and time of day could be used as covariates if necessary.  
Data Analytic Plan 
 Because of the nested nature of the data (i.e., moments nested within-participants), multi-
level modeling was used to test the hypotheses unless otherwise noted.  Multi-level modeling 
parses variance into multiple components (i.e., for each level) and allows the researcher to fit a 
model to explain variance within each level (Singer & Willett, 2003).  Multi-level modeling is 
also advantageous for ecological momentary assessment data because it is robust to missing data 
at lower levels (e.g., missing assessments within a day; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012).  Given 
that the primary outcome is a binary variable (0 = no substance use, 1 = substance use), I used a 
generalization of multi-level modeling for non-linear models (Little, Milliken, Stroup, & 
Wolfinger, 2006).  I report p-values along with confidence intervals, consistent with current 
recommendations in the literature (e.g., Cumming, 2014). 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Prior to the main analyses, I conducted several sets of analyses to better understand these 
data. First, I ran site (Fz, Cz, CPz, Pz) by accuracy (error/loss, correct/win) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs on the ERN and FRN data to ensure that the expected effects were present in these 
data.  Second, I looked at correlations among indices of self-control.  This was done by looking 
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at between-subject Pearson’s correlations.  Based on prior research (Cyders & Coskunpinar, 
2011; McHugh & Otto, 2012), it was expected that the correlations would be small-to-nil.  This 
was however, deemed informative because no study to my knowledge has included this 
combination of self-control indices.   
Next, I ran a series of analyses to identify covariates that would be useful for the main 
analysis. Given that participants from the two recruitment sources differed on age, race, 
education, income, and lifetime alcohol and substance use disorder symptoms, I examined 
whether these between-subject factors were related to reported substance use in the ecological 
assessment portion of the study (the main dependent variable), as well as whether reported 
substance use varied as a function of recruitment source.  In these models, the log odds of 
substance use at the current time point in ecological portion of the study served as the dependent 
variable and the potential covariate as the Level 2 predictor variable. A second set of analyses 
looked at whether the within-subject factors of time of day (i.e., survey 1-4) and day of the week 
(i.e., weekend versus weekday) had a relation with substance use.  This was based on previous 
studies that have found that substance use is more likely to occur in the evening and on 
weekends (e.g., Buckner et al. 2012; Hopper et al., 2006).  In these analyses, time (mean-
centered) and weekend (effect coded) and their interaction served as Level 1 predictors of 
substance use. 
 Finally, I examined patterns of substance use during the ecological assessment part of the 
study to better characterize the dependent measure. Thus, I calculated the percentage of prompts 
where substance use occurred, the number of substance use days, and number of different 
substances used.  To help establish that participating in the ecological momentary assessment did 
not change the participants’ use or reporting of substance use, I compared the number of alcohol 
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and substance use days from the week before the study, as assessed via TLFB (TLFB-Pre) to the 
estimates from the ecological portion of the study. For convergent validity, I also compared the 
number of alcohol and substance use days as assessed from the ecological portion of the study to 
the TLFB interviews conducted following week 1 and 2 (TLFB Week 1 and Week 2). 
Primary Analyses 
To test the first hypothesis that state negative affect would prospectively predict 
substance use, the Level 1 (within-subject) model contained negative affect at the preceding 
assessment (i.e.., timet-1) to predict substance use at the current assessment (i.e., timet).  Negative 
affect was centered within-subjects, which unconfounds between-subject and within-subject 
variation (Curran & Bauer, 2011; Enders & Tofighi, 2008) and allows for the slope to be 
interpreted as a purely within-subject effect (i.e., change from that person’s average). It was 
predicted that the relation between timet-1 negative affect and timet substance use would be 
positive and confidence interval will not contain zero.  
 To test hypotheses 2-3 (the interactions between trait self-control and state negative 
affect), a series of models were fit.  In each model, one individual difference measure of self-
control (e.g., task monitoring on the BRIEF) was added as a Level 2 predictor. Additionally, 
significant covariates (i.e., age; time, day of week) were included.  Of more importance was the 
cross-level interaction between self-control and negative affect at timet-1. It was predicted that 
this interaction would be significant for adjustment (shifting on the BRIEF and PES) and 
persistence (inhibition on the BRIEF, mirror-tracing time, breath holding time) but would not be 
significant and have a tight confidence interval around zero for monitoring (task monitoring on 
the BRIEF, ERN, FRN). Significant interactions were followed up with generalizations of Aiken 
& West’s (1991) methods for probing interactions between continuous variables (Preacher, 
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Curran, & Bauer, 2006).  Specifically, the relation between negative affect and substance use 
was examined at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of self-control.  It was predicted that the 
slope would be significant and positive at low levels of adjustment and persistence.  Secondary 
analyses were conducted with positive affect in place of negative affect, to determine specificity 
of effects.   
Finally, I conducted some robustness analyses to see whether effects were still significant 
when adjusting for positive affect, recruitment source, and compliance with the ecological 
momentary assessment procedure. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Missing data 
 Due to a variety of reasons, some participants were missing data on tasks or assessments.  
One participant used the wrong keys on the flanker task, and did not have usable data for ERN 
and PES.  There were EEG recording errors for two participants on the flanker task, leaving a 
total of 58 participants with ERN data.  One person was missing mirror-tracing data, and one 
person was missing the BRIEF, both due to experimenter error.  In addition, two participants did 
not complete any surveys during the ecological momentary assessment portion of the study.  
Thus, there were slightly different N’s for each analysis ranging from 57 to 61. I used all 
available data in each analysis to avoid post hoc justifications for excluding participants (e.g. 
Simons et al., 2011) 
Event-related Potentials 
 For ERN, there was not a significant main effect of accuracy, F(1, 56) = 1.68, p = .200, 
but there was a main effect of site, F(5, 280) = 5.31, p < .001, and an accuracy x site interaction, 
F(5, 280) = 4.01, p = .001.  Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that there was a significant 
effect of accuracy at CPz, Cz, and FCz (p’s < .025, d’s < -.30), a marginal effect at Fz (p = .086, 
d = -.23), and no significant effect at Pz (p = .854, d = .02).  In order to maximize the reliability 
of the ERN as an individual difference measure, I used the average across FCZ, CZ, and CPZ 
sites.  
 For FRN, there were significant main effects of feedback, F(1, 59) = 11.10, p = .002, site, 
F(5, 295) = 3.93, p = .002, but not a significant feedback x site interaction F(5, 295) = 1.13, p = 
.345.  The follow-up tests showed that the effect of feedback was significant for each site (d’s < -
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.34), but was numerically largest at Cz.  Similar to ERN and other research (Kujawa et al., 2014), 
I used the average across FCZ, CZ, and CPZ to calculate the FRN. The appendix on page 78 has 
figures that display waveforms for a subset of electrode sites and average waveforms. 
Correlations Among Self-control Indices 
 The correlations among the different measures of self-control are displayed in Table 3.  
Consistent with other research (e.g., Letkiewicz et al., 2014), all subscales of the BRIEF were 
positively and significantly correlated with each other at moderate-to-large effect sizes.  There 
was some evidence of correlations among different measures of the same aspects of self-control.  
For example, there were small, but not significant, positive correlations between self-reported 
problems in task monitoring and FRN (more problems monitoring, less differentiation between 
wins and losses) and ERN. There was statistically significant correlation was between PES on 
the flanker task and the shifting subscale of the BRIEF.  The correlation was moderate in size 
and indicated that fewer problems with shifting in everyday life were related to greater PES.  The 
correlations among the persistence measures were small and close to zero.  There was also some 
evidence of overlap across different aspects of self-control.  For example, problems inhibiting 
were significantly correlated with both ERN and PES both with small effect sizes.3  The limited 
significant correlations across the measures is not uncommon in the literature (Cyders & 
Coskunpinar, 2011; McHugh & Otto, 2012), but also may be influenced by limited statistical 
power for small to medium correlations (i.e., power for r = .3 was .66; power to for r = .25 was 
.50). 
 
 
                                                 
3 Breath holding was the only self-control measure with a significant difference between recruitment sources on self-
control (d = .66), with participants from the prior study having lower values. 
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Identifying Covariates 
 To determine between-subject covariates, I ran 8 separate models where I considered one 
potential between-person covariate at a time (i.e., age, race [White, Black, and other effect 
coding], income4, education, symptom counts of substance use disorder, symptom counts of 
alcohol use disorder, and sample recruitment source) to predict reports of substance use since the 
last period of ecological momentary assessment.  Then, I ran one additional model with all 
potential covariates entered simultaneously to predict reports of substance use.  In separate 
models, none of the potential covariates was significantly related to reports of substance use.  
When entered simultaneously, age was significantly negatively related, b = -.07, 95% CI [-.12, -
.02] t(41.73) = -2.84, p = .007, and thus was retained a covariate throughout the analyses. 
 To look at whether time of day or day of the week were related to reports of substance 
use, I ran a model with time of day (mean-centered) and day of the week (effect coded as to 
Friday and Saturday versus other days of the week), and their interaction, predicting substance 
use at the current assessment. Time was not related to substance use, b = .001, 95% CI [-.09, 
.10], t(2244) = 0.00, p = .994, but day of the week b = -.11, 95% CI [-.22, -.01], t(2244) = -2.11, 
p = .035, and their interaction, b = -.12, 95% CI [-.32, -.02] t(2244) = -2.46, p = .014, were 
related to reports of substance use.  The nature of this interaction was that time of day was 
negatively related to the probability of substance use on weekdays, b = -.12, 95% CI [-.22, -.02], 
t(1624) = -2.46, p = .014, with the likelihood of substance use decreasing throughout the day on 
weekdays, whereas the effect was non-significantly in the opposite direction during the 
weekends, b = .12, 95% CI [-.03, .28] t(619) = 1.49, p = .136.  This finding likely reflects the 
fact that on weekdays, participants were most likely to use substances in the evening, but not 
                                                 
4 Following the suggestion of one of my committee members, I explored whether the relation between negative 
affect and substance use varied as a function of income.  The interaction was not significant (b = -.01, 95% CI [-.12, 
.10]), nor was the main effect of income on substance use days (b = -.09, 95% CI [-.25, .06]). 
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report them until the next morning, whereas on weekends, participants were equally likely to use 
substances throughout the day with a trend toward using later in the day. Based on these results, 
time of day, day of the week and their interaction were included in all subsequent models. 
Descriptive Analyses and Frequency of Substance Use 
During the ecological momentary assessment, participants used any substance an average 
of 9.50 (SD = 4.17, median = 11, mode = 14, min = 0, max = 14) days out of the 14. Eighty-two 
percent of participants (N = 49) reported substance use on 6 or more days of the 14-day study 
period.  However, recruitment source differences were observed for number of substance use 
days.  Participants recruited anew reported more overall substance use days (d =1.11), marijuana 
use days (d = .97), and alcohol use days (d = .60).  The two sources did not significantly differ 
for other substance use days (d’s ranged from -.25 for cocaine to .53 for opioids).  These results 
suggest that, although the participants from the previous study had more lifetime symptoms of 
substance use disorder, the newly recruited participants were currently using substances more 
frequently. 
On substance use days, the majority of participants reported using 1 (28% of use days), 2 
(26%), or 3 (20%) times per day.  On average, participants reported using substances 25.83 times 
during the study period (SD = 17.63, median = 24, mode = 7, min = 0, max = 86), with 70% of 
the sample using 10 or more times during the study period.  Only one participant reported no 
substance use during the ecological momentary assessment period.  The results did not change 
whether or not this participant was included in the analyses, so the participant was included. 
Participants on average reported using 2.58 (min = 0, max = 5) different types of substances 
during the study period. Overall, these results suggest that there was substantial substance use by 
the majority of participants during the study period. 
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To establish validity for the self-reports of substance use during the ecological 
momentary assessment, the data from the weekly TLFB reports of number of alcohol and 
substance use days were compared to the number of alcohol and substance use days calculated 
from the ecological momentary assessment data. Table 2 displays the means, confidence 
intervals, and correlations among the measures. In the week before the study (i.e., TLFB-Pre), 
participants reported using alcohol approximately two days per week.  This is in line with the 
number of alcohol use days per week reported on the TLFB Week 1 and TLFB Week 2 and the 
reports during the ecological momentary assessment.  Similar results were found for substance 
use days.  Participants reported approximately 4 substance use days in the week prior to the 
study (TLFB-Pre) and during the study period (ecological assessment).  These suggest little-to-
no change in alcohol and substance use during the study period.  Additional validity support was 
found in the large correlations between the TLFB and ecological assessment methods (r’s > .60). 
These analyses help establish the validity of substance use as reported during the ecological 
momentary assessment period. Moreover, these analyses are evidence that participants were not 
affected in their reports by the act of recording substance use regularly as part of the ecological 
momentary assessment protocol.  
Main Analyses 
 Contrary to my first hypothesis, negative affect at the previous time point was not related 
to reports of substance use at the current time point, b = -.14, 95% CI [-.38, .08], t(2184) = -1.25, 
p = .211.  Although not significant, negative affect was instead related to a lower probability of 
substance use.   
The second hypothesis involved the moderating role of self-control. The main effects of 
self-report task monitoring (p = .940), ERN (p = .481), and FRN (p = .682) were not 
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significantly related to reports of substance use.  Consistent with my prediction, monitoring (self-
reported task monitoring or ERN) did not significantly interact with negative affect at the 
previous time point to predict substance use (task monitoring: b = .24, 95% CI [-.36, .85], 
t(2134) = .76, p = .434; ERN: b = .02, 95% CI [-.02, .06], t(2104) = .89, p = .373).  Counter to 
my prediction, there was a significant interaction with FRN, b = -.04, 95% CI [-.08, -.01], 
t(2132) = -2.42, p = .015.  The nature of the interaction was that for participants with less 
differentiation between wins and losses (i.e., +1 SD), meaning less monitoring, negative affect 
was significantly negatively related to substance use, b = -.64, 95% CI [-1.11, -.18], t(2132) = -
2.73, p = .006.  For participants who had a large differentiation between wins and losses (-1 SD; 
i.e., more monitoring), however, negative affect was not significantly related to substance use, b 
= .16, 95% CI [-.18, .50], t(2132) = .92, p = .355.  Follow-up analyses showed that the 
interaction was only significant for FRN at site CPz and did not even approach significance at 
the other sites.  Given that this interaction was not predicted, had a counter intuitive pattern and 
was only significant for one site, it was not interpreted further. 
 For adjusting measures, self-reported shifting problems on the BRIEF did not have a 
significant effect on substance use (p = .912), but there was a significant interaction between 
negative affect and self-reported shifting problems, b = .54, 95% CI [.03, 1.04], t(2134) = 2.07, p 
= .038.  The nature of the interaction (shown in the top panel of Figure 1) was that, at low 
problems with shifting (-1 SD), there was a significant negative relation between negative affect 
and substance use, b = -.45, 95% CI [-.81, -.08], t(2134) = -2.41, p = .014 whereas at high 
problems with shifting (+1 SD), there was a positive, although not significant, relation between 
negative affect and substance use, b = .07, 95% CI [-.24, .37], t(2149) = .42, p = .671.  The 
interaction of negative affect and PES was not significant, b = -.004, 95% CI [-.01, .01], t(2140) 
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= -1.34, p = .181, but in the same conceptual direction as for self-reported shifting (see bottom 
panel of Figure 1).  Indeed, the simple slope of negative affect at high PES (analogous to low 
problems in shifting) was marginally significant and negative, b = -.36, 95% CI [-.75, .006], 
t(2140) = -1.93, p = .054, whereas it was not significant at low PES, b = -.01, 95% CI [-.31, .34], 
t(2140) = -.06, p = .953. Thus, consistent with my prediction, operationalizations of the adjusting 
aspects of self-control interacted with state negative affect to predict substance use; however, the 
nature of the interaction was more nuanced than expected. That is, people who are better able to 
adjust their behavior in order to achieve their goals are less likely to use substances during 
negative affect states, whereas negative affect plays a much smaller role among people who are 
less able to adjust. 
 For persistence, there were no significant main effects of self-reported inhibition (p = 
.249), mirror tracing time (p = .539), or breath holding (p =  .701), nor did any of them interact 
with negative affect (inhibition: b = .29, 95% CI [-.30, .86], t(2134) = .97, p = .334; mirror 
tracing: b = -.00001, 95% CI [-.001, .001], t(2140) = -.02, p = .9855; breath holding: b = .006, 
95% CI [-.009, .02], t(2141) = .77, p = .441), which was inconsistent with predictions. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Unlike negative affect, positive affect at the past time point had a significant positive 
relation with substance use at the next time point, b = .46, 95% CI [.30, .61], t(2184) = 5.61, p < 
.001, indicating that positive affect, not negative affect, preceded substance use.  Similar to 
negative affect, none of the operationalizations of monitoring significantly moderated the 
relationship between positive affect and substance use (all p’s > .248), nor did either aspect of 
adjusting (all p’s > .258). Although, none of the operationalizations of persisting significantly 
                                                 
5 The results regarding the mirror tracing time were the same when only including participants who reported an 
increase in distress from before to after the task (N = 56, b = -.0001, 95% CI [-.001, .001]) and when adjusting for 
the number of errors made (b - .0001 95% CI [-.001, .001]). 
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moderated the link between positive affect and substance use, analyses involving the time to quit 
index of the mirror tracing task revealed a possible interaction between positive affect and 
persistence that approached significance, b = .0008, 95% CI [-.0003, .002], t(2140) = 1.38, p = 
.169 (inhibit p = .712; breath holding p = .206).  The nature of this nonsignificant interaction was 
that the link between positive affect and substance use was stronger for people who persisted 
longer during the mirror tracing task (+1 SD), b = .60, 95% CI [.34, .86], t(2140) = 4.49, p < 
.001, compared to those who quit earlier (-1 SD), b = .32, 95% CI [.07, .57], t(2140) = 2.53, p < 
.015 (see Figure 2).  I cautiously interpret this to indicate that people who are good at persisting 
in the face of emotional distress (versus those who are not) may be somewhat more likely to 
engage in substance use when they are in a positive mood. 
 Given that negative affect and positive affect often have a small to moderate negative 
correlation (e.g. Watson, 2000; in this sample: r = -.07, p = .555 for between-subject; r = -.16, p 
< .001 for within-subjects), I re-ran all the analyses with both affect types and their interactions 
with self-control to predict substance use at the next prompt of the ecological momentary 
assessment.  Results were the same as those reported above.  The only change worth noting was 
that the p-value for the interaction between positive affect and mirror tracing time was closer to 
significance, p = .087. I also re-ran analyses of all the significant and near significant results 
including recruitment source and its interaction with all factors in the model.  Recruitment source 
did not further moderate any of the results, suggesting a similar pattern for both recruitment 
sources.6 I also re-ran significant analyses with compliance, as indicated by number of prompts 
                                                 
6 I also ran the significant analyses separately for each recruitment source.  The slopes for the shifting by negative 
affect interaction were in the same direction and similar in size for both sources (prior study: b = .38 95% CI [-.79, 
1.55}; new participants: b = .63 95% CI [.08, 1.19]), although it was only statistically significant for the newly 
recruited participants.  The follow up simple slopes tests were similar (i.e., same direction, similar size [-.29, -.51]), 
as were the results for PES.  Differences in significance are likely due to limited statistical power for the participants 
from the prior study given the much smaller N. 
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completed as a covariate. The interaction for shifting was still significant (p =.029) and the 
marginal interactions for PES (p =.163) and mirror tracing time (p = .089) were still above the 
.05 cut off.  Thus, the results appeared to be robust to covariates. 
 One final set of exploratory analyses examined whether intensity of substance use 
moderated the relation between negative affect and substance use, as it was possible that 
negative affect may have stronger links to substance use among heavier users.  This was done in 
two ways.  First, I examined whether the count of substance use disorder symptoms reported on 
the SCID at baseline moderated the negative affect substance use relation.  Second, I used the 
TLFB-Pre as a more proximal indicator of intensity of substance use. In neither case was 
moderation significant (symptom count: b = .02, 95% CI [-.05, .09], t(2186) = .58, p = .560; 
TLFB-Pre: b = .05, 95% CI [-.05, .15], t(2162) = .96, p = .334). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISSCUSION 
 The primary goal of this study was to test whether individual differences in the 
monitoring, adjusting, and persisting aspects of self-control moderated the relation between 
negative affect and illicit substance use.  Of the hypotheses, the best support was for the 
moderating role of the adjusting aspects of self-control in the negative affect - substance use 
relation; however, the pattern of results for adjusting did not fit with my hypotheses.  Instead of 
negative affect being positively related to substance use at low levels of adjusting, it was 
negatively related to substance use at high levels of adjusting.  My other hypotheses received 
limited support. In particular, most monitoring aspects of self-control did not moderate the 
negative affect substance use relation.  This finding is far from definitive because of difficulties 
in interpreting null results.  Counter to my prediction, momentary negative affect at one time 
point did not predict substance use at the subsequent time point during the ecological momentary 
assessment data collection period, and the persisting aspects of self-control did not moderate the 
negative affect – substance use link.  In contrast, exploratory analyses showed that momentary 
positive affect was related to later substance use and there was weak evidence that this 
relationship is moderated by some aspects of persistence.  These results provide useful evidence 
to advance theories of affect, self-control, and substance use, which will be explored in the 
remainder of the discussion. 
Negative and Positive Affect and Substance Use 
 As mentioned in the introduction, there is a large body of theory and research suggesting 
that negative affect plays a role in substance use (Baker et al., 2004; Conger 1956; Koob, 2009).  
A closer examination of this literature, however, suggests a more complicated relation. 
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Laboratory studies that manipulate negative affect and measure alcohol and tobacco use find 
significant effects, but much smaller than would be predicted by theory (e.g., d’s ~ .30; Bresin, 
Mekawi, & Verona, in prep; Heckman et al., 2015).  Moreover, studies examining substance use 
in participants’ natural environment (i.e., ecological momentary assessment studies like this one) 
have found limited evidence for a strong direct relation between negative affect and substance 
use (e.g., Buckner et al., 2012; Dvorak, Pearson, Sargent, Stevenson, & Mfon, 2016; Shiffman, 
et al., 2002).  Our results add to this literature by suggesting that, for current illicit substance 
users, positive affect but not negative affect seems to precede substance use.   
There are several ways to interpret the body of results in relation to negative affect.  One 
possibility is that the relation between negative affect and substance use is more one of 
avoidance of affect rather than regulation of existing affect.  For instance, it is possible that 
current substance users have learned to anticipate unpleasant states and use substances well 
before negative affect occurs; thus, avoiding the experience before it starts. This may suggest 
that negative affect has a more historical, rather than proximal relation with substance use.  
Given that this study was designed to assess proximal relations, it is not well designed to test 
predictions derived from this model (e.g., current substance users might report less negative 
affect than non-users because they are successful at avoiding the experience of negative affect).  
Other designs would be needed to accurately test this theory. 
Another suggestion is that people who are regular users, as those included in this sample, 
use substances for a variety of reasons in a variety of situations (e.g., after waking up, socializing 
with friends, with certain foods) and negative affect is just one situation where substance use 
occurs (Shiffman, et al., 2002).  Therefore, across situations in everyday life, negative affect may 
not have a large role in substance use compared to other situations. This interpretation fits with 
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Shiffman, et al. (2002) who found that, in an ecological momentary assessment study of regular 
tobacco smokers, situational factors (e.g., being in an environment where smoking is allowed) 
were much better predictors of smoking than negative affect. Similar results have been found for 
cocaine and heroin (Epstein et al., 2009; Epstein & Preston, 2010).  This interpretation suggests 
that current theories, and interventions, may want to focus on the impact of situations, more so 
than proximal experiences of negative affect, that lead to substance use, at least among current 
users. 
A final interpretation that brings together the negative affect and positive affect findings 
of the current study is based on theoretical models emphasizing the stages of addiction (e.g., 
Baker et al., 2004; Koob, 2009).  These models suggest that in the early stages of addiction, 
substance use is driven by seeking positive affect associated with substance use, but as tolerance 
and withdrawal develop, substance use becomes driven more by efforts to avoid negative affect. 
As noted in the results, the newly recruited participants were mostly a group of substance users 
still in the earlier stages of their use, where use is driven by the positive experiences of substance 
use. The participants from our previous study, however, appeared to be past their stage of 
heaviest use, as indicated by their lower reports of substance use during the study period 
compared to their higher lifetime symptoms of substance use disorder and relative to the newly 
recruited participants.  Because the larger majority of participants in the study came from the 
former recruitment source, the results may not have shown a pattern of using substances to avoid 
negative affect (and perhaps more use of substances to enhance positive affect). Not necessarily 
inconsistent with either interpretation, there may be key moderators that change the way that 
negative and positive affect are related to substance use (e.g., self-control).   
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Multi-modal Assessment of Self-control and Substance Use 
As with negative affect, regardless of how self-control was operationalized, it failed to 
show significant main effects on substance use.  This is particularly surprising because prior 
research has suggested that self-report measures of self-control may be better able to predict 
everyday self-control failures (Rabin et al., 2011), but not even the BRIEF subscales predicted 
substance use in participants’ everyday environment.  This may be due to the fact that among 
substance using participants, substance use may not be a self-control failure, or that among 
current users, factors other than self-control drive substance use. 
Consistent with prior research (Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011; McHugh & Otto, 2012), I 
generally found small correlations between the self-report assessments of self-control and the 
psychophysiology and behavioral assessments. Two significant correlations across modalities did 
emerge: behavioral PES and self-reported shifting on the BRIEF and FRN and self-reported task 
monitoring.  Still, these correlations were modest.  Perhaps more interesting was the similarity of 
the moderation results for PES and self-reported shifting (see below). The fact that the 
interaction generalized beyond one operationalization of adjusting provides stronger support that 
the results are due to the latent/hypothetical construct of adjusting rather than any particular 
operationalization.  Nonetheless, the results from this study do little to clarify the existence of 
small correlations among different modalities of self-control or the general lack of relationships 
with substance use in everyday environment.   
Self-control as a Moderator of the Affect-Substance Use Relation 
 I had two unique predictions for the moderating role of self-control.  I predicted that, 
because monitoring is necessary but not sufficient for self-control, it would not moderate the link 
between negative affect and substance use.  This was supported by a nonsignificant interaction 
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across two operationalizations of monitoring (e.g., ERN and self-reported task monitoring), 
although an interaction was detected for FRN in only one channel with questionable 
interpretability.  It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to interpret null results because 
they may reflect a false-negative or a true null-effect.  In this case, the confidence intervals were 
fairly narrow around zero, but were wide enough to include small effect sizes, indicating that 
there may be meaningful effects that would be significant in larger samples.  Thus, even though 
the results were in line with my hypothesis, they should be interpreted with caution.  Taken at 
face value, these results suggest that one’s ability to identify the need for self-control, as assessed 
in both self-reported and psychophysiological measures, does not play much of a role in 
continued substance use following negative affective experiences.  These results may seem at 
odds with between-group studies showing that people with substance use disorders have smaller 
ERNs than healthy controls (Franken et al., 2007; Sokhadze et al., 2008). The current study 
differs from this line of research in that I was focused on how self-control might moderate the 
negative affect - substance use relation among current users, not whether the cognitive processes 
indexed by the ERN differ between people with and without a substance use disorder.  Together, 
extant findings may indicate that monitoring difficulties, as operationalized by ERN (and 
perhaps other monitoring indicators) are useful in differentiating individuals with a substance use 
disorder, but may not be useful in predicting future substance use among current users. 
My second prediction in relation to the moderating role of self-control was that both 
adjusting and persisting aspects would moderate the relation between negative affect and 
substance use.  This interaction was found for the adjustment, but not the persistence, aspects of 
self-control. For adjustment, self-reported adjusting and, much more modestly, behavioral 
adjustment (PES) moderated the negative affect-substance use relationship.  The exact pattern of 
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results did not fully conform to my predictions, with negative affect playing a role for those who 
are good, not bad, at adjusting.  That is, negative affect did not relate to substance use at low 
(versus high) adjusting; instead, negative affect was negatively related to substance use at high, 
but not low, adjusting.  Thus, people who are good at adjusting are less likely to use substances 
following negative affect.  
To interpret this interaction, it is useful to reconsider the definition of the adjusting 
aspects of self-control, which is to adjust thoughts, feelings, and behaviors to be in line with 
goals once a discrepancy is noticed. Assuming that people generally have the goal of reducing 
negative affect (e.g., Riediger et al., 2011), it is possible that individuals high in the adjusting 
aspects of self-control use strategies other than substance use to change their thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors to decrease their experience of negative affect. Further assuming that the strategies 
that people high in adjusting may have access to are more effective than using substances at 
reducing negative affect, overtime these individuals may become less likely to use substances 
during periods of negative affect. For example, if someone who is high in the adjusting aspects 
of self-control experiences negative affect because they have bills to pay but are not currently 
employed, they may be more likely to fill out job applications than use substances because it is 
more in line with their goal of employment. This interpretation fits with the conceptual overlap 
between the adjustment aspects of self-control and emotion regulation (e.g., Bonanno & Burton, 
2013; Gross, 1998).  Further research is needed to understand whether it is access to more 
strategies or access to specific strategies that explain the interaction. 
Unlike adjustment, none of the indices of persistence significantly moderated the link 
between negative affect and substance use.  This pattern of results may come from the fact that 
this sample included current users, and persistence may play a bigger role among those trying to 
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remain abstinent.  This is because among current users, substance use may not be as directly 
inconsistent with their current goals7, whereas among people trying to maintain abstinent, 
substance use and their current goals are in greater conflict. In the latter case, persistence is 
needed to pursue one goal over another.  This fits with research showing that measures of 
persistence are related to relapse (Brown et al., 2002).   
The fact that adjusting and not persisting was found to moderate the negative affect – 
substance use link indicates that these two aspects of self-control rely on different strategies.  
Adjusting relates to making changes in the face of goal discrepancy, which explicitly reflects 
behavioral strategies (e.g., engaging in a behavior other than substance use). Adjusting also has 
direct link to negative affect, because negative affect is usually a sign of goal discrepancy (e.g., 
Carver & Scheier, 1998), and thus the need for change in behavior.  Persisting, in contrast, does 
not involve change and instead involves ignoring goal-inconsistent thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2011), which may include negative affect, but may also include 
competing goals (e.g., should I study or should I spend time with friends).  Thus, persistence, at 
least construed generally, has less of a direct link with negative affect than adjusting. 
Finally, there was evidence of a marginally significant interaction between task 
persistence, as defined by time-to-quit on the mirror tracing task, and positive affect.  The nature 
of this interaction was that positive affect was more strongly related to substance use among 
people high (versus low) in persistence.  These results would support the exploratory hypothesis 
that using substances as a response to enhancement motives is a more controlled behavior. 
                                                 
7 As argued in the introduction, using substances may be part of a long causal chain that may be inconsistent with 
one’s goals.  For example, if someone wants to maintain a job and works at an establishment that has random drug 
tests, using substances interferes with their work goals, but not as much as using substances interferes with 
abstinence goals.  
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However, the finding resulted from exploratory analyses and was only of marginal significance.  
Therefore, a replication would be necessary before this result should be interpreted further. 
Limitations and Strengths 
 There are several limitations to consider when interpreting the results of this study.  First, 
there are concerns about participant’s ability to report accurately on their affect while 
intoxicated.  Although valid reports of affect have been shown in laboratory studies involving 
alcohol consumption, there is limited data to support the validity of affective ratings under the 
influence in the real world (see Shiffman, 2008 for a discussion of this issue).  Second, some of 
my results might be driven by the unique characteristics of the sample.  The sample was fairly 
heterogeneous in many ways (e.g., demographics, substance of primary use).  Even though steps 
were taken to statistically adjust for these differences, there may be meaningful subgroups where 
different results may be present.  Due to university restrictions on purchasing, I was limited to 
participants who already owned smartphones, which may have excluded certain groups of 
participants (e.g., those with heavier substance use).  Second, there are ways that some aspects of 
the ecological momentary assessment protocol might have affected the results.  For example, it is 
possible that negative affect and substance use are related in shorter timeframes (e.g. a few 
minutes as opposed to a few hours). Further, I only assessed for the presence of any substance 
use but not the amount.  Some research suggests that negative affect is predictive of heavier use 
(e.g., White, Anderson, Ray, & Mun, 2016); therefore, it’s possible that more detailed 
assessment of substance use might yield different results. Third, participant’s varied substance 
use histories could have contributed to noise in the ERPs, which may have increased the 
possibility of type-II errors for monitoring, suggesting the null results should be interpreted with 
caution.  Fourth, this study was focused on substance use among current users, and may not 
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explain how self-control and affect may be involved in relapse.  Finally, all of these results are 
correlational, and causal claims cannot be made from these data, although some of these results 
may be replicated in experimental studies.  
 There are also several strengths of this study worth noting.  First, I combined laboratory 
assessments of self-control with ecological assessments of affect and substance use.  This design 
capitalized on the strengths of each method and avoided important limitations, particularly in that 
it replaced retrospective reports of affect with momentary reports and replaced artificial 
administrations of substances in a laboratory with naturalistic substance use measured in 
participants’ natural environments.  This combination of methods also contains a longitudinal 
component in that both self-control and affect were measured prior to the substance use. Second, 
I used a multi-method assessment of self-control, which in cases where the results were 
consistent across modes (e.g., adjusting), provide stronger evidence for the role of self-control. 
Finally, I recruited a clinical sample that reported heavy illicit substance use of multiple 
substances during the study period.  
 This project makes several clear additions to the substance use literature that will inform 
future research.  Most important is the finding that the adjusting aspects of self-control moderate 
the negative affect-substance use relation, such that negative affect is related to less substance 
use among current users scoring high (versus low) in the adjusting aspects of self-control.  One 
future direction would be to use experimental methods to determine whether training in 
adjustment (e.g., through cognitive bias training; Grönholm-Nyman et al., 2017) would show a 
similar reduction in substance use during periods of negative affect.  If similar results were 
found, this research would have clear implications for intervention development.  Another future 
direction would be to see whether the same relationships are present in individuals trying to 
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remain abstinent who relapse.  It is possible that negative affect and the adjusting aspects of self-
control may have very different relations with substance use in the context of relapse (cf., 
Shiffman et al., 1996).  This research would also likely have implications for intervention, as 
preventing lapses is a key part of early recovery. 
In addition to a replication of these results in another sample, future research and theory 
should seek to understand the psychological processes by which individual differences in 
adjusting moderate the relation between negative affect and substance use (e.g., specific 
strategies).  This study established the moderating effect of adjustment, but does not explain the 
mechanisms.  Future studies may wish to identify the strategies that individuals high in 
adjustment use during periods of negative affect (e.g., attentional allocation, reappraisal, etc.). In 
contrast, our null moderation results for monitoring and persisting may indicate that researchers 
should reconsider their role in the link between negative affect and substance use.  Together, the 
results of this paper have helped to elucidate the roles that negative affect and self-control play in 
substance use, which should help the development of more effective treatments to reduce the 
burden of substance use on society. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Demographics for the Entire Sample and Separately by Recruitment Source. 
    Full Sample   Previous Study New Participants 
(n = 61)   (n = 16)   (n = 45) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Age M (SD)   29.11 (11.63)  43.31 (12.84)** 24.06 (5.37) 
Gender % (n)  
Men    53% (32)  44% (7)  56% (25) 
Women   47% (29)  56% (9)  44% (20) 
Ethnicity % (n) 
Hispanic   5% (3)   0% (0)   7% (3) 
Non-Hispanic   95% (58)  100% (16)  93% (42) 
Race** % (n) 
Caucasian   62% (38)  44% (7)  69% (31) 
African American  18% (11)  56% (9)  5% (2) 
Asian American  8% (5)   0% (0)   11% (5) 
Middle Eastern  2% (1)   0% (0)    2% (1) 
Latinx    2% (1)   0% (0)    2% (1) 
Other    8% (5)   0% (0)    11% (5) 
Education* % (n) 
< = High School Diploma 16% (10)  31 % (5)  11% (5) 
Some College   75% (46)  69% (11)  78% (35) 
> = Bachelor’s Degree 9% (5)   0% (0)   11 (5) 
Income* % (n) 
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Table 1 Cont. 
< 30,000    52% (31)  81% (13)  40% (18) 
$30,001 - 45,000   8% (5)   19% (3)  5% (2) 
$45,001 - $60,000  5% (3)   0% (0)   7% (3) 
$60,001 - $75,000  8% (5)   0% (0)   11% (5) 
>$75,000   27% (16)  0% (0)   36% (16) 
AUD Symptoms M (SD) 3.27 (3.15)  5.91 (3.18)**   2.37 (2.63) 
SUD Symptoms M (SD) 5.34 (3.59)  8.31 (2.41)**  4.28 (3.36) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < .05. For continuous variables (age, AUD symptoms and SUD symptoms), 
the analyses were independent samples t-tests.  For categorical variables (ethnicity, race, 
education, and income), the analyses were chi-square tests for independence. < = less than or 
equal to; > = greater than or equal to; AUD = Alcohol Use Disorder; SUD = Substance use 
Disorder. 
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Table 2 Number of Self-reported Alcohol and Substance Use Days Per Week [95% Confidence 
Intervals] in the Week Prior to the Study and During the Ecological Momentary Assessment 
Period. 
     Alcohol Use   Substance Use   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Week Prior TLFB (N = 61)  2.40 [1.85, 2.94]  4.64 [3.95, 5.34] 
Week 1 
 TLFB (N = 45)  2.15 [1.54, 2.76]  4.66 [3.88, 5.44]  
 EMA (N = 59)   2.28 [1.72, 2.85]  5.23 [4.74, 5.73] 
 r    .70 [.50, .82]   .60 [.37, .77] 
Week 2 
TLFB (N = 42)  2.25 [1.54, 2.85]  4.17 [3.33, 5.00] 
 EMA (N = 55)  1.69 [1.23, 2.14]  4.74 [4.12, 5.37] 
 r    .79 [.64, .88]   .73 [.54, .84] 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. TLFB = Timeline Follow Back; EMA = Ecological Momentary Assessment. r = the 
correlation between TLFB and EMA. 
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Table 3 Correlations [95% Confidence Interval] Among Indices of Self-control. 
   1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7. 
Monitoring 
1. Task Monitoring - BRIEF __ 
2. ERN       .22  
[-.05, .45]  __ 
3. FRN       .23        .16 
[-.02. 46]  [-.10, .40]  __ 
Adjusting 
 
4. Shifting- BRIEF .46        .21       .02 
[.23, .64]**   [-.05, .45]  [-.23, .28]  __ 
5. PES        -.26        -.12       -.07       -.36* 
[-.48, -.01]  [-.36, .14]  [-.32, .18]  [-.56, -.11]     __ 
Persisting 
 
6. Inhibit - BRIEF     .59         .30       -.02       .48       -.28 
[.39, .73]**  [.05, .52]*  [-.28, .23]  [.26, .65]**  [-.49, -.03]*    __ 
7. MT        -.02        -.05       -.01       -.01      .16      -.14 
[-.27, .22]  [-.30, .21]  [-.26, .25]  [-.26, .24]  [-.09, .40]  [-.38, .11]   __ 
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Table 3 Cont. 
8. BH        .03       .09       -.01       -.09       .09       .09       .09 
[-.22, .28]  [-.18, .34]  [-.27, .24]  [-.33, .16]  [-.17, .34]  [-.16, .33]  [-.16, .49] 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. **p  >. 001, * p < .05. BRIEF = Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function; ERN = Error-related Negativity, FRN = 
Feedback Related Negativity, PES = Post-Error Slowing, MT =Mirror Tracing, BH = Breath Holding. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
 
Probability of Substance Use at the Current Assessment as a Function of Negative Affect at the 
Previous Assessment and Self-reported Shifting (top panel) and Post-error Slowing (bottom 
panel) 
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Figure 2  
Probability of Substance Use at the Current Assessment as a Function of Positive Affect at the 
Previous Assessment and Mirror-tracing time. 
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APPENDIX A – Waveform Morphology 
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APPENDIX B – Event-related Potentials 
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